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          NO. 42966 
 
          Bonneville County Case No.  
          CR-2013-17966 
 
           
          RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
 
     
      Issue 
Has Iverson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied her Rule 35 motion for reduction of her concurrent unified sentences of 27 years, 
with 13 and one-half years fixed, imposed upon her guilty pleas to three counts of 
delivery of methamphetamine and two second or subsequent offense enhancements? 
 
 
Iverson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
 
 Iverson pled guilty to three counts of delivery of methamphetamine and two 
second or subsequent offense enhancements, and the district court imposed concurrent 
unified sentences of 27 years, with 13 and one-half years fixed.  (R., pp.73-76.)  Iverson 
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filed a timely Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.  (R. pp.89-92.)  The district court 
denied the Rule 35 motion.  (12/11/15 Minute Entry and Order (Augmentation).)  Iverson 
filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.78-81.) 
Iverson asserts the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 
motion for reduction of sentence in light of her age, difficult childhood, substance abuse 
and mental health issues, family support, purported remorse, and because she believes 
the plea agreement was “unduly harsh.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.4-6.)  Iverson’s argument 
fails for at least three independent reasons. 
First, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Iverson’s Rule 35 motion. 
 Rule 35 provides both that a district court may reduce a sentence within 120 days after 
judgment and that a motion for reduction may be made within 120 days after judgment.  
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a trial court has jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 35 
motion within a “reasonable time” after the expiration of the 120 days.  State v. 
Chapman, 121 Idaho 351, 352, 825 P.2d 74, 75 (1992).  If, however, the trial court fails 
to rule upon the motion “within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 120-day 
period, the trial court loses jurisdiction.”  Id. at 354, 825 P.2d at 77.  In addition, it is the 
movant’s responsibility to “precipitate action on a Rule 35 motion within a reasonable 
time frame, or otherwise provide an adequate record and justification for the delay, to 
avoid the risk of the trial court losing jurisdiction.”  State v. Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 619, 
977 P.2d 228, 233 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Day, 131 Idaho 184, 186, 953 P.2d 
624, 626 (Ct. App. 1998)); State v. Simpson, 131 Idaho 196, 197 n.2, 953 P.2d 636, 637 
n.2 (Ct. App. 1998). 
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Iverson filed her Rule 35 motion 108 days after judgment was entered. 
 (Compare R., p.73 (judgment filed November 21, 2014) with p.89 (Rule 35 motion filed 
March 9, 2015).)  The district court had a “reasonable time” to rule on the motion; 
however it failed to do so until December 11, 2015 – 277 days after the motion was 
filed.  (12/11/15 Minute Entry and Order (Augmentation).)  Because nothing in the 
record justifies such a lengthy delay, the court had no jurisdiction, 385 days after the 
entry of judgment, to rule on the motion.  The order denying Iverson’s Rule 35 motion 
should be affirmed because the district court lost jurisdiction, due to the passage of 
time, to rule on the motion. 
Second, even if not jurisdictionally barred, Iverson’s claim of an abuse of 
discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error.  A party is estopped, under the 
doctrine of invited error, from complaining that a ruling or action of the trial court that the 
party invited, consented to or acquiesced in was error.  State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 
402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 2000).  The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to 
prevent a party who “caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court” to 
take a particular action from “later challenging that decision on appeal.”  State v. Blake, 
133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999).  This doctrine applies to sentencing 
decisions as well as to rulings during trial.  State v. Leyva, 117 Idaho 462, 465, 788 
P.2d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 1990). 
As part of the binding Rule 11 plea agreement, the parties stipulated to the 
imposition of an aggregate unified sentence of 27 years, with 13 and one-half years 
fixed.  (R., pp.53-56.)  At the sentencing hearing, the prosecuting attorney and defense 
counsel asked the district court to follow the plea agreement, and the district court 
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followed the plea agreement and imposed concurrent unified sentences of 27 years, 
with 13 and one-half years fixed.  (11/19/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-17; p.10, Ls.13-17; p.28, 
Ls.13-20.)  Because Iverson received the sentences she requested, she cannot claim 
on appeal that her sentences are excessive or that the district court abused its 
discretion by declining to reduce her sentences.  Therefore, Iverson’s claim of an abuse 
of sentencing discretion is barred by the doctrine of invited error. 
Finally, even if this Court considers the merits of Iverson’s claims, she has still 
failed to establish an abuse of discretion.  In State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 
P.3d 838, 840 (2007), the Idaho Supreme Court observed that a Rule 35 motion “does 
not function as an appeal of a sentence.”  The Court noted that where a sentence is 
within statutory limits, a Rule 35 motion is merely a request for leniency, which is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Thus, “[w]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the 
defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional 
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” 
 Id.  Absent the presentation of new evidence, “[a]n appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 
motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence.”  Id.  Accord 
State v. Adair, 145 Idaho 514, 516, 181 P.3d 440, 442 (2008). 
In support of her Rule 35 motion, Iverson pointed out her age, reiterated that she 
has family support, and stated she felt the plea agreement was “unduly harsh” because 
she learned, “[a]fter [she] entered into the plea agreement, and at sentencing,” that “the 
Prosecutor’s sister-in-law had prior dealings with [Iverson], and the Prosecutor was 
aware of said dealings and potentially acted outside her normal mode of operation.”  
(R., pp.89-92.)  None of this was “new” information before the district court.  The district 
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court was aware, at the time of sentencing, of Iverson’s age and family support.  (PSI, p. 
1; 11/19/14 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-15.)  As Iverson acknowledged in her Rule 35 motion (R., 
p.90), she was aware, “at sentencing,” that the prosecutor’s sister-in-law had prior 
dealings with Iverson, and Iverson nevertheless agreed to maintain her guilty plea and 
be bound by the plea agreement (11/19/14 Tr., p.7, L.16 – p.8, L.7).  As this information 
was available at the time of sentencing, it was not “new” information, nor is Iverson’s 
unsupported claim that the plea agreement by which she agreed to be bound was 
“unduly harsh” a basis to reduce her sentence.  Because Iverson presented no new 
evidence in support of her Rule 35 motion, she failed to demonstrate in the motion that 
her sentence was excessive.  Having failed to make such a showing, she has failed to 
establish any basis for reversal of the district court’s order denying her Rule 35 motion.     
 
Conclusion 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying Iverson’s Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence. 
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